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Abstract
The emphasis in post-Keynesian macroeconomics on wage- versus prot-
led growth may not have been helpful. The prot share is not an exoge-
nous variable, and the correlations between the prot share and economic
growth can be positive for some exogenous shocks but negative for others.
The terminology, second, suggests a unidirectional causality from distrib-
ution to aggregate demand while in fact distribution can itself be directly
a¤ected by shifts in aggregate demand. The reduced form correlations,
third, depend on interactions with the labor market, and a focus on the
goods market can be misleading. If, fourth, empirical estimates are taken
at face value, the support for wage-led conclusions is much weaker than
suggested by the literature. A focus on the growth-benets of a reduction
in inequality, nally, makes for an impoverished policy discussion.
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1 Introduction
The distribution of income is of the greatest importance. It is important in
its own right and also because of interactions between distribution and other
economic and social outcomes. Not everyone agrees with these claims. In fact, a
focus on distribution has been seen as distinctly harmful by some; Lucas (2004)
famously commented, "Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics,
the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on ques-
tions of distribution". Fortunately, there are signs that inequality will now be
receiving greater attention throughout the profession.
To their great credit the post-Keynesian and neo-Marxian traditions have al-
ways emphasized distributional issues. The forms, however, that this attention
have taken may not be the most productive. In the post-Keynesian tradition
the concepts of wage- and prot-led growth have dominated the discussion. The
concepts are dened with reference to the properties of aggregate demand, and
countless contributions have elaborated ways in which the functional distribu-
tion could a¤ect the di¤erent components of demand. Empirical studies have
followed up by estimating these e¤ects econometrically.
I want to question this approach. Concepts of wage and prot led growth are
well-dened in benchmark models with restrictive assumptions. The concepts
become less helpful  and possibly misleading  if the restrictive assumptions
are relaxed. In general, it makes little sense to refer to an economy as being
wage or prot led. More specically, I shall argue that
 reduced-form correlations between income distribution and economic growth
depend on the nature of the underlying exogenous shocks or policy in-
terventions. For some shocks the reduced-form correlation between the
wage share and economic growth may be positive, suggesting a wage-led
economy; for other shocks the correlation may be negative, suggesting a
prot-led economy.
 the concepts of wage and prot led growth are unhelpful when it comes to
analyzing what interventions  whether by policy makers or social move-
ments  could be used to change economic outcomes in the direction of less
inequality and greater social justice while maintaining full employment.
 the distribution of income may itself depend on aggregate demand. Reduced-
form correlations between the prot share and aggregate demand may re-
ect the e¤ects of aggregate demand on prots rather than (or as well as)
the e¤ects of distribution on aggregate demand.
 whether an economy is wage or prot led depends not only on the prop-
erties of the goods market but also on the specication of the rest of the
economy, including the labor market.
 empirical studies of the e¤ects of distribution on aggregate demand and
economic growth have produced weak and inconclusive results. Problems
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that are intrinsic to macroeconometrics  including questionable data qual-
ity and short time series - account for some of the weaknesses but the
specication of the regressions, the econometric approach and the inter-
pretation of the results can be questioned too.
 a strong focus on the growth-benets of redistribution makes for an impov-
erished policy discussion. Support for policies that reduce inequality need
not be contingent on whether these policies will tend to raise aggregate
demand and the rate of economic growth.
The time dimension of the relation between income distribution and growth
is sometimes left ambiguous. The original contributions to the literature on
wage-led growth took a medium to long run perspective. This would also seem
to be the perspective of many recent contributions, including the much cited
studies in Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013). Indeed, gains from an increase in
the wage share would seem rather uninteresting if they are not sustainable be-
yond the short run. This paper therefore considers medium or long run interac-
tions between distribution and economic growth. It should be noted, however,
that the time dimension can be critical for the observed correlation, and the
wage/prot led terminology is sometimes being used with respect to short-run
cyclical patterns (e.g. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor 2006, von Arnim and Barrales
2015). The forces which determine long-run correlations may be quite distinct
from those that govern short-run correlations, and the usefulness of the termi-
nology to describe cyclical patterns is beyond the scope of this paper.1
Section 2 provides a brief outline of the benchmark analysis of wage- and
prot-led growth. Section 3 describes a general mathematical structure that
highlights some of the issues. Section 4 discusses the dependence of reduced-form
correlations on the underlying shock. Section 5 introduces a demand-dependent
distribution of income. Section 6 analyzes the e¤ects of distributional change on
employment and economic growth when a labor market is added to the model.
Econometric work on wage- and prot-led growth is considered in section 7.
Section 8 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
2 The benchmark analysis
The Kaleckian model that has dominated post-Keynesian macroeconomics was
developed independently by Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984) and subsequently
modied by Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). Using standard notation the Dutt
version of the model can be stated as follows:
1Blecker (2016) suggests that the empirical literature has paid too little attention to the
time dimension.
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IK
= + u+ u;  > 0;   0 (1)
S
K
= su (2)
I
K
=
S
K
(3)
 =  (4)
g = K^ =
I
K
   (5)
where I; S;K; ; u and g denote investment, saving, the capital stock, the prot
share, the output capital ratio and the net accumulation rate. Assuming a
xed coe¢cient production function, the output capital ratio can be used as a
measure of capacity utilization, and I shall refer to it as the utilization rate.
With a constant utilization rate, the growth rate of output is equal to the
accumulation rate.
The model produces steady growth solutions for the utilization rate and the
growth rate;
u =

s      
(6)
g = s

s      
   (7)
and the e¤ects of a change in  are given by
du
d
=
 (s  )u
s      
(8)
dg
d
= su   s
(s  )
s      
u =
 su
s      
(9)
Dutt assumes that the Keynesian stability condition is satised; that is, s >
 + . The model  using Marglin and Bhaduris terminology  is therefore
stagnationist (du

d
< 0) and growth is wage led (dg

d
< 0).
Dutts specication of investment and saving can be seen as a special case
of a generic post-Keynesian specication:
I
K
= i(u; ); iu > 0; i  0 (10)
S
K
= s(u; ); su > 0; s > 0 (11)
Using these generic forms, the e¤ects of changes in the prot share can be
written
du
d
=
i   s
su   iu
(12)
dg
d
= su
du
d
+ s (13)
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The generic specication does not necessarily produce a stagnationist and wage
led economy. Dutts version implies three restrictions on the generic form: (i)
su > iu; (ii) s(u; ) = su; (iii) iu =  + u i:
Marglin and Bhaduris inuential contributions questioned the third of these
restrictions. Specically, they suggested replacing (1) by
I
K
= + u+ ;  > 0;   0 (14a)
Hence, keeping the saving function (2),
du
d
=
i   s
su   iu
=
   su
s   
R 0 (15)
dg
d
= su
du
d
+ s = s
   su
s   
+ su (16)
=
s
(s   )2
[(s   2)  ] R 0 (17)
The re-specication eliminates restriction (iii), and without (iii) the restric-
tions (i) and (ii) no longer ensure that i   s will be negative. Essentially
the Marglin-Bhaduri modication allows a stronger sensitivity of investment to
prots relative to the sensitivity to utilization. As a result of this relative weak-
ening of the utilization e¤ect on investment, the model allows for the possibility
of both prot- and wage-led outcomes.
It should be noted that the same widening of the range of possibilities to
include prot-led regimes could be achieved by abandoning one of the rst two
restrictions and retaining the third:
 A Harrodian approach questions the validity of the Keynesian stability
condition in the long run (Auerbach and Skott 1988, Skott 2012). If
restriction (i) is reversed and iu > su; the sign of the denominator in (12)
changes but the numerator may still be negative. It follows that utilization
 and a fortiori economic growth  can be prot led.
 The classical saving function  assuming that there is no saving out of
wage income  is often introduced as a simplifying assumption with the
implied suggestion that results carry over to the more general case in which
the saving propensity out of prots exceeds the saving propensity out of
wages. The simplifying assumption is not innocuous, however: if (ii) is
relaxed to allow saving out of wage income then (i) and (iii) no longer
ensure that the numerator in the expression for du=d will be negative.2
2Let
S
K
= (s0 + s)u
where s0 is the saving rate out of wages and s is the di¤erence between the saving rates. Then
u =

s0 + s      
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Thus, abandoning any one of the three restrictions may reverse the e¤ect of
changes in the prot share on utilization. Marglin and Bhaduri retained the
rst two restrictions and relaxed the third.
Whatever assumptions are being made about the relative magnitudes of
iu; i; su and s; the concepts of wage- and prot-led growth are well-dened
in the benchmark model if the distribution of income is exogenous and, second,
the parameters of the saving and investment function are independent of shocks
to the distribution of income.
3 Mathematical structure
It may be useful to consider a general mathematical structure before turning
to the specics of wage-led growth. Assume that two endogenous variables, x
and y, are determined by the equations
x = F (y;Z) (18)
y = H(x;Z) (19)
where Z is a vector of exogenous variable. One could now ask whether x is y led.
But the question seems neither helpful nor interesting. Solving equations (18)-
(19)  assuming for simplicity that they have a unique solution  we can write
x and y as functions of the exogenous variables
x = (Z) (20)
y = 	(Z) (21)
The solutions in (20)-(21) do not exclude reduced-form correlations between x
and y, but the correlations are contingent. Shocks to exogenous variables may
a¤ect both x and y; and the resulting correlation between the two will  in
general  depend on which of the exogenous Z-variables have been shocked, as
well as on the properties of both the F and H functions.
Two well-known examples may illustrate the point. Consider a standard
IS  MP model:
Y = F (i;G; :::) (22)
i = H(Y ; p^T ; :::) (23)
where government consumption (G) and the target rate of ination (p^T ) are
among the exogenous variables. Equation (22) is the IS relation, and the MP
relation in equation (23) describes monetary policy (a Taylor rule).
and
du
d
= u
   s
(s0   ) + (s  )
It follows that du=d can be positive for parameter values that do not violate the Keynesian
stability condition: the two inequalities    s > 0 and s0    + (s   ) > 0 can both be
satised if s0    > 0:
Although often overlooked, the restrictiveness of the classical saving assumption has been
noted by, among others, Taylor (1990) and Lavoie (1992).
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One can examine the properties of the two equations  including the signs of
the partials Fi and HY but it is unhelpful to ask whether output is interest-led
in the IS-MP model. If, nevertheless, the question is being asked, attempts to
settle the issue empirically by estimating the a relation between Y and i would
be misguided. The reduced-form correlation between output and the interest
rate depends on whether uctuations in Y and i reect shocks to government
consumption G (or other components of autonomous demand) or shocks to the
ination target p^T (or other determinants of monetary policy).
As a second example, consider a standard microeconomic model of a single
market. Do we want to refer to output as being price led if the correlation
between output and price happens to be positive for a particular market over a
particular period?
4 Shock-dependent reduced-form correlations
The general argument has implications for the literature on wage-led growth.
This section examines issues associated with the exogenous variables and their
e¤ects, assuming that there is no direct feedback from growth to distribution
(corresponding to the special case of (18)-(19) in which Hx = 0); section 5
considers implications of feedback e¤ects from growth to distribution (Hx 6= 0).
The wage-led versus prot-led terminology focuses on distributional out-
comes: it leaves open the question of how to e¤ect changes in distribution and
it may give the impression that the precise manner in which distribution is
changed will be of secondary importance.
Assume that policy makers want to increase the wage share. The wage share
is not itself an instrument, but a variety of interventions could be used in an in-
uence distribution. Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013a, pp. 16-17) outline some
of them, including interventions to strengthen unions, increases in unemploy-
ment benets or nancial regulation. For present purposes let us simplify and
consider two approaches to raising the wage share: one that aims to improve
the bargaining strength of workers in the expectation that this will translate
into higher real wages, and one that aims to a¤ect rms pricing behavior by
increasing competition in the product market, regulating monopolies, or other
types of industrial policy that could reduce the markup.
Policies of the rst kind  strengthening workers  typically get more of a
hearing. At some level this seems surprising since a key Keynesian insight has it
that wage bargaining does not directly determine the real wage. Let us assume,
however, that a strengthening of workers leads to a rise in the real wage and
a decline in the prot share, that is, a shift in equation (4). Other equations
in the model may be a¤ected too. Indeed, standard Marxian and Kaleckian
arguments would suggest that a strengthening of workers can have a negative
impact on the business climate and animal spirits (Kalecki (1943)).
The Marxian/Kaleckian argument can be questioned. Using the Dutt spec-
ication of investment, one could argue, for instance, that the prot rate enters
the investment equation (1) precisely in order to capture the e¤ects of work-
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ers strength and the general business climate. That is not the way in which
the specication is usually defended but, more importantly, an argument along
these lines could leave the uncomfortable impression that somehow the para-
meters of the equation can be seen as completely independent of policies and
institutional structures. This is not, I believe, a route that most post-Keynesians
would want to travel. It would be quite paradoxical to do so: the ahistorical
and institution-blind approach of mainstream economics has been a recurrent
theme in heterodox critiques of mainstream models. Thus, an a-priori rejection
of shifts in investment following a rise a workers power would seem hard to
defend. Consider therefore the case in which the accumulation function shifts
down as a result of policy measures to strengthen workers.
If w represents an indicator of workers strength and if the shift in the
accumulation function a¤ects the parameter  in equation (1), we have
d
dw
< 0;
d
dw
< 0 (24)
Using (6)-(7) it follows that
dg
dw
=
@g
@
d
dw
+
@g
@
d
dw
<
@g
@
d
dw
(25)
Now consider an approach centered on the goods market, and assume that
industrial policy can a¤ect the markup. Formally, let p be an indicator of
goods market competition and assume that d=dp < 0: Industrial policy may
also have ramications for other behavioral equations, but there would seem no
reason to believe that the shifts will be exactly the same as those produced by
the strengthening of workers. The case for a negative impact on the investment
function (over and above what is captured by the prot term) would seem to be
weaker, and for the purposes of this example I shall assume that the investment
and saving equations are una¤ected by the changes in p.
The assumption of unchanged investment and saving behavior implies that
in this case we get
dg
dp
=
@g
@
d
dp
(26)
Comparing (25) and (26) it is apparent that for some parameter values the
reduced-form prot-growth correlations will be positive if the shifts in distribu-
tion are brought about by strengthening workers (changes in w) but negative
if they are brought about by increasing competition (changes in p):
The specic assumptions in this example can be challenged. I want to em-
phasize, however, that the general argument does not depend on these assump-
tions. It only requires the possibility that policies that shift distribution by a
certain amount can di¤er in their e¤ects on one or more of the other equations.
This argument  it seems to me  should not be contentious to economists who
believe that institutions matter.
Figure 1 illustrates the general argument. The original equilibrium is at
E1; and two interventions are considered. Both interventions shift the vertical
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 curve to (z2). The e¤ect on the g-curve, however, depends on the type of
intervention: one intervention shifts the growth curve down with a new equi-
librium at E2; the other intervention leaves the growth curve unchanged and
the new equilibrium is at E3. The rst intervention would appear to suggest a
prot-led economy; the second would appear to suggest a wage-led economy.
Figure 1 about here
Special cases of the general argument have appeared in the literature. Skott
(1989) analyzed di¤erences in the e¤ects of increases in workers strength and
increases in competition, as in the example above. Blecker (1989, 2011) has
made a similar point with respect to foreign trade. A reduction in the prot
share raises exports if it is the result of a fall in price for given money wages
and a given nominal exchange rate. By contrast, reductions in the prot share
that derive from an increase in money wages or an appreciation of the exchange
rate may cause a decline in exports and lead to downward pressure on aggregate
demand and economic growth.
5 Prot-led growth or growth-led prots?
Section 4 left out feedback e¤ects from aggregate demand to income distribution.
In terms of the general equations in section 3, it was assumed that Hx = 0. It
would seem hard, however, to exclude the possibility that prices and prot shares
respond to demand conditions. Certainly, the inuence of demand on pricing
was accepted by early post-Keynesians. Steindl (1952, p. 228), for instance,
argued that
the prot function will depend on the degree of utilisation (a high
utilisation shifting it upwards, and a low utilisation downwards)
Robinson took a similar position. She assumed (Robinson, 1962, p. 46) that
competition (in the short-period sense) is su¢ciently keen to keep
prices at the level at which normal capacity output can be sold.
In fact, proponents of the wage-led / prot-led terminology  including the
early contributions by Dutt and Marglin-Bhaduri  also posited links from the
utilization rate to the prot share.3 But the implications of a two-way interac-
tion do not always seem to be fully appreciated.
Formalizing the Steindl-Robinson argument,4 the prot share is predeter-
mined at any moment but responds gradually to utilization, shifting upwards
3Skott and Zipperer (2012) present a generic post-Keynesian model of pricing and invest-
ment in which Kaleckian, Robinsonian and Kaldorian specications emerge as special cases.
Their empirical results using US data lend support to a Kaldorian position with fast adjust-
ments in the prot share. See also Skott (1989, 2015).
4The formalization of the Steindl-Robinson argument can be kept simple for present pur-
poses. See Flaschel and Skott (2006) for a more detailed interpretation and analysis of Steindls
argument.
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(downwards) when utilization is high (low). Thus, let
_ = h(u; ); h1 > 0; h2 < 0 (27)
where _ = d=dt is the rate of change of the prot share. This dynamic equation
for the prot share can be combined with the generic post-Keynesian speci-
cation of investment and saving. The utilization rate is determined by the
equilibrium condition for the product market in the short run,
i(u; ) = s(u; ) (28)
or
u = u(); u0 T 0 (29)
where the sign of u0() depends on the magnitudes of the di¤erent partial deriv-
atives of i(u; ) and s(u; ): For concreteness, assume that aggregate demand is
stagnationist, that is, u0() < 0 in the relevant range for the prot share. We
then have
_ = h(u(); ) (30)
and
d _
d
= h1u
0 + h2 < 0 (31)
It follows that there is (at most) one stationary solution and that this solution
is stable (if it exists).
Consider the case in which the stationarity condition for the prot share
(h(u; ) = 0) yields a positive relation between  and g, and assume that the IS
relation (goods market equilibrium) implies a negative relation between g and ,
as shown in Figure 2.5 The variables are di¤erent, but formally the situation is
now completely analogous to the IS-MP example in section 3; shocks to animal
spirits (shifts in the g() curve) correspond to shifts in the IS curve. These
shocks change the growth rate and the prot share in the same direction. Since
5A similar gure appears in Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). Using a diagram with utilization
and the prot share along the axes, Marglin and Bhaduri depict an IS curve along with a
exible markup equation in their gure 4.1.
As a simple specication leading to the constellation in gure 2, let
_ =  a+ bu  c
I
K
= + u
S
K
= su
We now have
(g) =  (
a
c
+
b
c
) +
b
c
g
g() = +

s   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the exogenous shifts come from shocks to animal spirits one could reasonably
talk of a growth-led prot share.6
Figure 2 about here
The example is exceedingly simple but the lesson is general: the pres-
ence of a two-way relation between aggregate demand and income distribution
complicates any attempt to draw causal inference from reduced-form correla-
tions between economic growth and the distribution of income. Post-Keynesian
economists are clearly aware of this identication problem. But the labeling of
economies as wage or prot led tends to obscure the issues.7
The problem is not just econometric. Consider the general setting in section
3 and assume that somehow the problems of identication and endogeneity bias
have been resolved and that we have a clean estimate of the F (y; Z) function.
An upward shift in the H function will a¤ect the equilibrium solution for y but
complete knowledge of the F function does not tell us whether the equilibrium
solution rises or falls. The change in y will depend on the properties of the
H(x; Z) function as well as on the F function. To see this, assume for simplicity
that there is a shock to a single exogenous variable z and that this variable does
not enter the F function. Thus,
x = F (y) (32)
y = H(x; z) (33)
and,
x = F (H(x; z)) (34)
Total di¤erentiation implies that
dx
dz
=
F 0Hz
1  F 0Hx
if F 0Hx 6= 1 (35)
Knowing the value of F 0 does not determine the sign of dx=dz. Figures 3a and
3b illustrate the issue. The F function is taken to be positively sloped and
unchanged in the two gures. The H curve is also positively sloped, but atter
than F in gure 3a and steeper than F in gure 3b. In both gures the shock to
z leads to an upward shift in the H curve. In gure 3a the equilibrium solution
for y increases; in gure 3b the equilibrium solution for y decreases.
Figures 3a-3b about here
The analysis has implications for the wage-led literature. Consider the de-
nition suggested by Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013a, p. 17; italics in original):
6Ryoo (2016) applies a Kaldorian model where the prot share adjusts to clear the goods
market to US trends in income distribution.
7Dos Santos (2015) raises similar issues. Using a Marxian circuit of capital approach
he argues that the distribution of income will be jointly determined with output and that
empirical work trying to establish the causal e¤ect of distribution on growth is misguided.
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if income distribution in a country is shifting in favour of prot recip-
ients, does this by itself have favourable consequences on aggregate
demand in the short run, on the growth rate of aggregate demand
in the long run, or on the growth rate of labour productivity? If
indeed this shift towards prots has favourable repercussions on the
economy, as we have just dened them, then we shall say that this
economy is in a prot-led economic regime. If not, if the shift towards
prots has a negative impact on the economy, then the economy is
in a wage-led economic regime.
Disregarding the other performance indicators, it is not entirely clear how this
denition should be interpreted when there are feedback e¤ects from growth to
distribution. If shifting in favor of prots is interpreted as an ex post outcome
in which for some reason prots have increased, then the denition would seem
to refer to the reduced-form correlation between growth and distribution. In
this case no causality can be assigned and the correlation will depend on the
nature of the shocks. If the shifting represents an upward shift in the functional
relation between the prot share and growth (a shift to the right of the (g)
curve in a diagram with  and g on the axes); the implications depend on the
slopes of both the g and the  curves. Yet, the suggested test for whether an
economy is wage-led refers exclusively to the direct e¤ect of changes in the prot
share on aggregate demand and economic growth (Lavoie and Stockhammer, p.
21):
an economy is in a wage-led demand regime when an increase in the
wage share (or a decrease in the prot share) leads to an increase
in the sum of the components of aggregate demand; and we will say
that an economy is in a prot-led demand regime when an increase
in the prot share (or a decrease in the wage share) leads to an
increase in the sum of the components of aggregate demand.
This test also dominates much of the empirical literature: economies are de-
clared wage or prot led on the basis of regressions that aim to identify the
direct e¤ects of the prot share on aggregate demand and economic growth
(section 7 below). This approach is conceptually misguided if there are feed-
back e¤ects from the growth rate and the level of aggregate demand to the
distribution of income.
6 Adding a labor market
The criticisms in sections 3-5 apply broadly to the concept of a wage or prot
led economy; they are not specic to any particular version of the generic post-
Keynesian economy in equations (10)-(11). This section introduces an extension
of the generic model.
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Most post-Keynesian models and almost all Kaleckian models leave out any
consideration of employment rates and the labor market.8 This approach could
be justied by a dual-economy argument. Economies may appear to uctuate
around levels associated with unemployment rates in the range from 2-12 per-
cent, but in fact there may be no e¤ective labor market constraints on economic
growth: immigration, induced technical change or the presence of internal
reservoirs of underemployment could imply that the growth rate is determined
exclusively by the growth in aggregate demand. The analysis in sections 4-5
accepted this premise.
The dual-economy argument has merit with respect to many LDCs but not,
I would argue, for economies like the US, Japan and most parts of Europe.
Undoubtedly, there is some endogeneity in the growth of the labor supply in
e¢ciency units, but I see neither empirical nor theoretical support for a reverse
Says law in which any long-run growth rate in aggregate demand can be met
by increases in employment and productivity. Thus, it may be of interest to
consider a labor constrained economy. A labor constrained economy need not
always be at full employment in any meaningful sense, but long-run growth is
constrained by the natural growth rate, n, using Harrods terminology. The
natural growth rate is often taken to be exogenous, but an economy can be labor
constrained without the exogeneity assumption: the natural growth rate may
depend on other variables, including the employment rate.
Models that assume equality between the long-run average of the actual
growth rate and the natural growth rate need to consider the mechanisms behind
the equalization. It is typically di¢cult to establish a oor under the growth rate
 that is, without policy intervention the actual growth rate could stay below
the natural rate, leading to ever-increasing unemployment as the employment
rate goes to zero. The ceiling on actual growth is easy, however: with a xed
coe¢cient production function, output cannot grow faster than the labor supply
(in e¢ciency units) in the long run, and capitalist rms will not keep investing in
more capacity if they cannot nd workers.9 This observation suggests a simple
way to modify the benchmark model in section 2: following Flaschel and Skott
(2006) and Ryoo and Skott (2008), the accumulation rate may depend inversely
on the employment rate.10 Shortages of workers may have a direct e¤ect on
rms hiring, but broader forces are also at work. As employment increases,
workers get stronger and the business climate deteriorates, as suggested by
Marx and Kalecki (cf. above).
The relationship between accumulation and employment is likely to be non-
linear: a rise in employment from 80% to 81% may have a negligible e¤ect on
accumulation, a rise from 98% to 99%, by contrast, may have a large e¤ect
8There are exceptions, also among Kaleckian models, but when labor markets are in-
troduced it is often assumed that the utilization rate can be used as an indicator of the
employment rate (e.g. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) and Sasaki et al. (2013)).
9Skott (1989) assumes that rms pricing and output decisions (rather than the investment
decision) depend on the state of the labor market. The two mechanisms, which have similar
e¤ects, are not mutually exclusive. The empirical results in Skott and Zipperer (2012) suggest
that the employment rate a¤ects both output and investment decisions.
10This assumption is consistent with the analysis in Robinson (1962, pp. 54-56).
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(it is this non-linearity that accounts for the asymmetry between establishing
ceilings and oors). For present purposes the asymmetry is irrelevant, and I
shall use a linear extension of the Marglin-Bhaduri equation,11
I
K
= + u+    e (36)
where e = L=N is the employment rate.
Normalizing the labor productivity to one (by measuring employment and
the labor force in e¢ciency units), the employment rate can be written as a
product of the utilization rate (the output capital ratio) and the ratio of the
capital stock to the labor force (k = K=N);
e = uk (37)
Using the classical saving function (2),
S
K
= su (38)
the conditions for steady growth at the natural rate can now be written
su = + u+    uk (39)
= n+  (40)
The rst equation is the equilibrium condition for the product market; the
second equation gives the required equality between the natural rate of growth
and the accumulation rate.
For the sake of argument, assume that the prot share is an exogenous
variable and that the issues in sections 3-5 do not arise. With  = , equations
(39)-(40) can be solved for u and k :
u =
n+ 
s
(41)
k =
s(+    n  ) + (n+ )
(n+ )
(42)
If the natural growth rate is exogenously given, changes in distribution have
level e¤ects on the employment rate. We have
e = uk =
+    n  

+
(n+ )
s
(43)
11An autonomous referee found this equation "alien to the Kaleckian approach", suggesting
that "Kaleckian models are not labor constrained".
My own view is that if the term "Kaleckian" is dened to exclude the e¤ects of unemploy-
ment on rms investment and price/output decisions, then Kaleckian models become largely
irrelevant for an understanding of many real-world economies. But this is a di¤erent issue;
for present purposes, it does not matter whether the specication is "Kaleckian".
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Growth e¤ects (in addition to level e¤ects) can be introduced by assuming that
the natural growth rate depends on the employment rate, i.e. let
n+  = (e); 0  0 (44)
The underlying mechanism behind (44) could be induced technical progress 
a tight labor market gives rms a stronger incentive to search for labor saving
innovations. Induced changes in the labor supply as a result of migration or
changes in the participation rate would have similar e¤ects.
Combining (43)-(44) we have
e +
(e)

 
(e)
s
=
+ 

(45)
Total di¤erentiation of equation (45) implies that
de
d
=
s2   
 es
2
(46)
dg
d
= 0(e)
de
d
=
0
 es
2
(s2   ) (47)
where the function  and its partial derivative  e are given by
 (e; ) = e +
(e)

 
(e)
s
(48)
 e = 1 +
0

(1 

s
) (49)
The sign of the partial derivative  e is likely to be positive. The presence of
employment-induced growth e¤ects is plausible but the e¤ects are likely to be
weak. I shall assume therefore that  e > 0: This condition is trivially satised if
the Keynesian stability condition is met ( < s); it is satised in the Harrodian
case with  > s if 0 is su¢ciently small.
The conditions for wage-led growth in the labor constrained Marglin-Bhaduri
model (LC-MB) can now be compared to those associated with the non-labor
constrained Marglin-Bhaduri (MB) model in section 2. Consider a simple Har-
rodian case with  > s;  < 0 and  = 0. Using (17) and (47) it follows
that the economy is prot led in the MB case but wage led in the LC-MB case
(assuming  e > 0). The two cases are illustrated in gures 4 and 5. The sav-
ing function rotates upwards in both gures when the prot share increases.
In gure 4 (the MB case) the result is an increase in the equilibrium solutions
for both utilization and the rate of growth. In the LC-MB model, the growth
rate has to be brought back to the natural rate n: This is achieved by a decline
in the stationary solution for the ratio of the capital stock to the labor sup-
ply, k: A decline in k implies a lower employment rate for any given value
of u; this in turn corresponds to an upward shift of the investment function in
the (u; g) space. With an exogenous natural rate, the economy returns to the
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same growth rate but with a lower utilization rate. Allowing for employment
e¤ects on the natural rate, the (e) curve describing the natural-rate would
shift downwards in the (u; g) diagram as k declines, and the new stationary
state will be characterized by lower economic growth (see gure 5).
Figures 4-5 about here
The results in equations (17) and (47) may be of interest in their own right.
There is also a general lesson: when the interaction across markets is taken
into account, conclusions that have been derived by considering one market
in isolation may no longer hold. This is a lesson that should be familiar to
Keynesians. The problem with pre-Keynesian economics was that
important mistakes have been made through extending to the system
as a whole conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in respect
of a part of it taken in isolation
(Keynes 1936, p. xxxii, preface to the French edition)
The pre-Keynesians were guilty of extrapolating from an analysis of the labor
market in isolation to the economy as a whole. The dangers of extrapolation
also arise when trying to move from a partial analysis of the product market to
the economy as a whole. A similar argument applies to discussions of nancial-
ization; the e¤ects of nancialization depend critically on the specication of the
non-nancial aspects of the economy, including both goods and labor markets
(Skott and Ryoo 2008).
It may be worth noting that the LC-MB case illustrates the possibility of sta-
bilizing cross-market interactions. To examine stability, the short run dynamics
need to be specied. Let
_g = (gd   g) (50)
_k = k(g   n  ) (51)
where gd and n +  are given by (36) and (44).12 Equation (50) captures a
standard Harrodian adjustment;13 equation (51) follows from the denition of
k as the ratio of capital to the labor supply.
12The utilization rate in (36) is given by the short-run equilibrium condition for the goods
market: u = g=(s):
13The equation could be cast in terms of adjustments in response to deviations of actual
utilization from a desired rate that is itself a function of growth, productivity and the em-
ployment rate. Dene ud as the value of the utilization rate which makes the accumulation
rate equal to the desired rate. Using (36), ud satises
ud =
g      + e

and we have
u  ud =
1

(gd   g)
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The unique stationary solution to this two dimensional system of di¤erential
equations satises g = n +  and k = [s + (n + )(   s)]=[(n + )]. The
Jacobian matrix is given by
J(g; k) =
0
@
( 
s
  k
s
  1)  n+
s
k(1  0 k
s
)  k0 n+
s
1
A (52)
The stability properties of the system are determined by the trace and deter-
minant of the Jacobian. Depending on parameter values, a range of outcomes
 stable as well as unstable  are possible. For present purposes the key point,
however, is methodological. There is a set of meaningful parameter values, such
that
 the goods market is unstable, leaving out the feedback e¤ects from k; that
is, ( 
s
  k
s
  1) > 0
 the two dimensional system in (50)-(51) is stable; that is, tr = ( 
s
  k
s
 
1) k0 n+
s
< 0 and det =  ( 
s
  k
s
 1)k0 n+
s
+k(1 0 k
s
)n+
s
> 0).
The example shows that destabilizing Harrodian feedback e¤ects in the goods
market do not necessarily imply that an economy will exhibit empirically im-
plausible knife-edge instability. Interactions with other parts of the economy
(and/or policy intervention) can stabilize the system. The steady growth path
may become asymptotically stable (as in the above example) or nonlinearities
can lead to bounded uctuations around a steady growth path that is locally
unstable (e.g. Skott (1989, 2015), von Arnim and Barrales (2015), Flaschel et
al. (1997)).
7 Econometric evidence
A large empirical literature has investigated whether actual economies are wage
or prot led. In accordance with the benchmark model in section 2, the focus
has been on the goods market. A standard procedure has been to run regressions
in which the components of aggregate demand are regressed on the prot share
and other controls. The economy is then declared wage led if the sum of the
coe¢cients on the prot share is negative. The results have been mixed, but
according to Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013a) the evidence shows that the
global economy is wage led and that the same applies to domestic demand in
most countries; some open economies are prot led because of the e¤ects of
distributional change on net exports.
Several methodological questions can be raised. As argued in section 4,
there is no reason to expect a stable reduced-form relation between income
distribution and growth. The correlations depend on the nature of shocks. The
correlations can be positive in some countries and for some periods but negative
for other countries or other periods; this can happen even without any shifts in
16
the direct feedback e¤ects between  and g (with unchanged partials Fy and
Hx, using the notation from the general setting in section 3). Moreover, the
e¤ects of shocks to exogenous variables on economic growth cannot be decided
without taking into account the feedback e¤ects from aggregate demand and
economic growth to distribution (section 5).
Shifts in the variables that is treated as exogenous can also a¤ect the direct
feedbacks (the partials Fx and Hy). This point is exemplied by the argument
in Palley (2014) and Carvalho and Rezai (2016). Aggregate demand may tend to
be prot led if wage distribution is skewed heavily in favor of the rich (who have
a high saving rate); a redistribution of wage income away from CEOs, bankers
and sports stars reduces the saving rate out of wage income and shifts aggregate
demand in a wage-led direction. An approach which treats the coe¢cient on
the prot share as a policy invariant parameter may therefore, Palley argues,
be subject to a Lucas critique.14
The Lucas critique also applies in another way. The reaction of prot seeking
rms to a demand shock depends on how the shock a¤ects their expectations
for future demand. These expectations will be conditioned by past experience.
The parameters of the investment function therefore will not be the same in two
economies, one in which the level of aggregate demand is subject to persistent
stochastic shocks around a constant trend rate of growth and one in which
the growth rate is subject to persistent stochastic shocks. Investment functions
for advanced economies arguably t the rst category, and in economies of
this kind the response is likely to be small. The Kaleckian benchmark model
without a labor market, by contrast, describes an economy in which the long-run
growth rate will be a¤ected by shocks to aggregate demand (a shift in income
distribution, for instance). Econometric results from economies of the rst type
say little about the parameters in an economy of the second type (Skott 2014).
Single equation OLS regressions, nally, will be biased if the prot share
depends on aggregate demand (section 5). Omitted variable bias is a potential
problem, too, if labor market e¤ects are excluded from the equations (section
6). The short-run correlation between capacity utilization and employment will
tend to produce a negative bias in the estimate for  if equation (36) describes
the investment function and the employment rate is omitted from the regression.
These methodological concerns would have been alleviated if the econometric
evidence had been strong and unambiguous. That is not the case. Blecker (2016,
p.1) comments that for many countries the "vast empirical literature has yet
to reach a consensus" on whether the economies are wage or prot led. This
inconclusiveness should not be surprising given the methodological concerns.
But there is an additional problem: despite claims to the contrary  and taking
the estimated coe¢cients at face value  the regressions do not in fact support
the Keynesian stability condition. This, in turn, a¤ects conclusions about the
wage-led character of the economy (section 2).
14Di¤erent, but related, arguments against the categorization of economies as either wage or
prot lad have been advanced by Nikiforos (2014). Nikiforos suggests that the parameters of
the investment and saving functions change endogenously and that economies may go through
phases of wage- and prot-led growth.
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Consider the results in Onaran and Galanis (2012) and take the Euro area
12 as an example.15 For the Euro area 12 they estimate the following log-linear
consumption and investment functions:
d logC = 0:006 + 0:127d logR+ 0:739d logW (53)
d log I =  0:304 + 2:238d log Y   0:137d log  + 0:088d log I 1
 0:203 log I 1 + 0:207 log Y 1 + 0:093 log  1 (54)
The consumption function is estimated in di¤erences and, curiously, does not
satisfy linear homogeneity, which would seem to make it suspect from a long-
run perspective. The investment function is cast in terms of levels and changes
in investment, output and the prot share; the capital stock and its utilization
rates do not enter the equation.
Onaran and Galanis claim that their results support the Keynesian stability
condition in the benchmark model. In order to assess the claim we need an esti-
mate for the long-run sensitivity of the accumulation rate (I=K) to a change in
utilization (Y=K). The investment equation does not provide that directly, but
an estimate can be inferred. The growth rates of investment, output and capital
are all equal in steady growth, and the ratios I=Y; Y=K and the prot share are
constant. This outcome is consistent with the estimated regression if we assume
that the coe¢cients on   log I 1 and log Y 1 (0.203 and 0.207, respectively) are
identical, a restriction that is clearly consistent with the econometric results. If
we denote the common growth rate by g, the long-run version of equation (54)
can be written
g =  0:304 + 2:238g + 0:088g   0:205 log(
I
K
=
Y
K
) + 0:093 log  (55)
=  0:304 + 2:326g   0:205 log(
g + 
u
) + 0:093 log  (56)
or
 1:326g + 0:205 log(g + ) =  :304 + 0:205 log u+ 0:093 log  (57)
The function is non-linear but total di¤erentiation (keeping  constant) gives
( 1:326 +
0:205
g + 
)dg =
0:205
u
du (58)
Using the benchmark values g +  = 0:1 and u = 0:5, the equation implies
that dg=du  0:6: Given the way it has been obtained, this long-run value must
be taken with a pinch of salt. Still, it is the point estimate implied by the
econometric results and taking the regression at face value, the saving rate (a
weighted average of saving rates out of wages and prots) would need to exceed
0.6 in order to satisfy the Keynesian stability condition. This minimum value is
far above the plausible range for the Euro area (or other advanced economies).
15Onaran and Galaniss study is representative of a larger literature, including Ederer and
Stockhammer (2007), Hein and Vogel 2008) and Stockhammer et al. (2009). Skott (2012)
raises some of the criticisms below in relation to Stockhammer et al. (2009).
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Thus, the Keynesian stability fails to hold and what looked like a wage-led
economy may in fact be prot led (section 2).16
These results are inconsistent with Onaran and Galanis conclusions. It
appears that they may be calculating long-run e¤ects of utilization on accumu-
lation by looking at the sensitivity of the level of investment to a change in the
level of output, keeping the growth rates constant.17 This calculation would be
consistent with their stated elasticity of I with respect to Y . It is not the rele-
vant calculation, however, for an evaluation of the long-run stability condition in
the Kaleckian model: the growth rate cannot be taken as constant if one wants
to examine the e¤ects of utilization on economic growth. To make this point in
a di¤erent way, consider the extreme Harrodian case in which accumulation is
perfectly elastic with respect to changes in utilization: the long-run investment
function is vertical and can be written simply as u = ud where ud is the desired
output capital ratio (utilization rate). With this Harrodian specication, a level
increase in output generates a level increase in the capital stock. We have
dK
dY
=
1
ud
and the long-run e¤ect on investment becomes
dI
dY
=

ud
Using benchmark values for the depreciation rate  (0:07) and the desired output
capital ratio (0:5), the long-run sensitivity of investment to a level increase in
output is 0.14 in this extreme Harrodian model. The long-run sensitivity of the
accumulation rate to utilization, by contrast, is innite.
8 Concluding remarks
My intention in this paper is not to deny or play down the signicance of the
functional distribution of income. Other dimensions of the distribution of in-
come may be at least as important from the perspective of equality or social
justice, and some of the dramatic changes in inequality fail to be captured by
movements in the prot share.18 But clearly the functional distribution is im-
portant, and it interacts with other aspects of economic performance. I do not
believe, however, that the current focus on wage versus prot led growth has
been very helpful.
From a theoretical perspective the wage/prot led terminology obscures sig-
nicant issues. I have argued that (i) the prot share is itself an endogenous
16Because of its lack of linear homogeneity, the consumption function (53) is only compatible
with steady growth at a unique growth rate: g = 6=134: It therefore makes little sense to
discuss the equations steady growth implications for the saving rate.
17 If the focus is not on long-run e¤ects, the strong short-run e¤ect of changes in output on
the change in investment cannot be ignored.
18Skott and Guy (2008, 2013) analyze power biased technological change as a source of
increasing earnings inequality.
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variable, and the precise nature of the underlying exogenous shocks can be criti-
cal: correlations can be positive for some changes but negative for others; (ii) the
wage/prot led terminology is misleading by suggesting a unidirectional causal-
ity from distribution to aggregate demand: distribution can be directly a¤ected
by shifts in aggregate demand, and these feedback e¤ects inuence the impact
of shocks to exogenous variables on economic growth; and (iii) the reduced-form
correlations between growth and distribution depend on interactions with other
markets, including the labor market.
These concerns provide strong reasons to re-think the way the inequality
issue has been addressed in (much of) heterodox macroeconomics. The concept
of a wage led economy is awed in the same way that concepts of interest-led
economies would be awed. Disregarding this conceptual issue, the weakness of
the empirical evidence raises another question. Would I advocate an increase
in inequality if it could be established that a rise in inequality tends to raise
the rate of economic growth? Certainly not, and I expect that many  both
economists and non-economists  would choose the same answer.19
It is dangerous to base policy recommendations for lower inequality on their
growth-enhancing benets. It is dangerous for a number of reasons. The weak-
ness of the empirical evidence and the theoretical problems with the concepts
provide one set of reasons. A general uneasiness about the universal benets of
higher growth may also weaken growth-based arguments; involuntary unemploy-
ment is a scourge, but environmental concerns as well as negative consumption
externalities (a la Veblen-Duesenberry-Sen-Frank) suggest that economic growth
as usually measured should not be the primary concern, at least for advanced
economies. Most importantly, however, we are not in a world in which only
one instrument  the share of prots  a¤ects aggregate demand and economic
growth; in fact, as argued in sections 4 and 5, the prot share is not even an
instrument but itself an outcome. A focus on wage- versus prot-led growth
distracts attention from the possibility that policy instruments can di¤er sig-
nicantly in the way they a¤ect inequality and economic growth (and other
variables). These di¤erences can be useful.
Instruments  including labor market policies, the regulation of nancial
and non-nancial sectors, taxes, transfers, public investment and education pol-
icy  can be combined to move income distribution towards greater equality
without reducing aggregate demand or economic growth. If it were the case
that lower inequality tends to reduce aggregate demand, there would be ways
to address this problem: a more expansionary monetary or scal policy is the
19Lavoie and Stockhammer may agree, I expect. But why then describe pro-labor reforms
in a prot-led economy as
doomed social reforms. It is the scenario that neoliberals claim would happen
if progressive social reforms were implemented. Margaret Thatchers famous
dictum, later repeated by several think-tanks and even left-wing politicians,
that there is no alternative (TINA), makes sense in this cell.
(Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013a, p. 20))
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obvious one.20 Measures to increase equality and social justice need not pass
a do-they-increase-economic-growth test. If greater equality is considered de-
sirable for other reasons, a test of this kind would produce an urgency to nd
both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of wage-led con-
clusions. Theories, however, should not be judged on whether they give some
pre-ordained, desired conclusions, and the heterodox tradition does itself a dis-
favor if its understanding of how the world actually works becomes based on
wishful thinking. Is there reason to fear a bias of this kind? Perhaps not. But
heterodox economists typically have no di¢culty seeing the conrmatory bias
when mainstream economists search for evidence that conrm their prior beliefs
(a belief, for instance, in labor market rigidities and generous welfare spending
as the causes of high European unemployment).
Am I setting up a straw man? I would be delighted to hear that no reader
interprets the literature on wage-led economies as suggesting that faster growth
provides a key argument for addressing inequality. But if there is no intention
to send this message, why focus so heavily on whether economies appear to be
wage led or prot led? It is time to move beyond the notion of wage and prot
led economies. Let us analyze the e¤ects of specic interventions to reduce
inequality. And if these interventions were to have adverse consequences for
aggregate demand, let us consider ways to address these demand problems. The
important point is that the TINA argument is invalid: there are alternatives to
neoliberal policies and increasing inequality. We do not need the wage/prot
led terminology to make this point.
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 Figure 1: Effects of interventions with the same effect on the profit share but different effects on the 
growth curve.  
  
Figure 2: Effects of shocks to animal spirits. 
  
   Figure 3a     Figure 3b 
 
Figures 3a and 3b: Effects of a shift in the H-curve.  
  
 
Figure 4: Effects of a rise in the profit share in the Marglin-Bhaduri model (without the Keynesian 
stability condition). 
 
Figure 5: Effects of a rise in profit share in the labor constrained Marglin-Bhaduri model. 
